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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the impact of alternative demographic futures on the 
Canadian pension system. 
The Canadian population, disaggregated by age, sex, and marital status, is projected 
forward to the year 2051 under six alternative sets of assumptions, comprising four 
sets shared by all national studies (including the benchmark scenario) and two sets 
specific to this study (including the national scenario). According to these 
projections, the old age dependency ratio, or ratio of the old age to the working age 
populations, will be multiplied by about 2.5 between now and 2030--slightly less 
under the benchmark scenario (based on unchanged patterns of fertility, mortality, 
and marital status change but assuming no external migration) but slightly more 
under the national scenario (based on a further mortality decline and allowing for 
external migration at mid-eighties levels). In other words, socio-demographic 
changes are likely in the future to exert some tremendous pressures on the financing 
of public pensions. 
Based on these demographic projections, use of the IIASA pension model reveals 
the ineluctability of a formidable increase in the contribution rate of workers to the 
CanadaIQuebec Pension Plan so that contributions to this plan continue to 
counterbalance the benefits offered to retirees (old age benefits to which any 
Canadian aged 65 and over is entitled are paid out of the general budget). But the 
increase required could be mitigated by the adoption of accompanying policies, two 
of which (increase in the labor force participation of men and raise of the 
retirement age) are also briefly investigated. 
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1. BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
Since the end of the Second World War, Canada has experienced broad 
demographic changes that are similar to those observed in most developed 
countries. They are: 
- an increase followed by a decrease in fertility as well as in nuptiality, 
- an increase in divorce, and 
- a decrease in mortality. 
Fertility 
The secular downward trend in fertility was interrupted by the so-called baby boom, 
which persisted from the early 1940s to the late 1950s. From 3.00 in 1945, the total 
fertility rate (TFR) increased to a maximum of 3.85 in 1959' (see Figure 1). 
Initially slow, the decline in fertility that followed the baby boom was truly rapid in 
the mid-sixties, as the TFR decreased sharply from 3.61 in 1963 to 2.39 in 1968. 
Thereafter, the TFR continued to decrease, although at a somewhat reduced pace 
before leveling off. Having fallen to 1.70 in 1980, it has since fluctuated between 
1.65 and 1.70. 
While the percentage of births to unmarried women was maintained at about 4 
percent of all births during the baby boom (Figure 2), it increased steeply 
thereafter, except between 1968 and 1974, to reach 18.3 percent in 1986. 
Nuptiality 
Like fertility, nuptiality has since the end of the Second World War experienced a 
boom followed by a bust. Thus, the proportion of those ever marrying, which 
increased steadily until some time in the sixties, has declined ever since. From 1971 
'concomitant to the one observed in the United States, this maximum preceded similar maxima 
observed in most European countries by four to five years. 
to 1981, this statistic decreased from 92 to 88 percent in the case of females and 
from 90 to 85 percent in the case of males (see Table I ) . ~  
A similar pattern of change can be observed for the remarriage of divorcees. After 
increasing right after the war, the proportion of divorcees who remarry has been 
declining since, dropping from 79 percent in 1971 to 69 percent in 1981 in the case 
of females and, somewhat less, from 85 to 80 percent in the case of males. By 
contrast, the remarriage of widow(er)s has almost constantly decreased since 1945, 
falling in 1981 to 17 percent in the case of widowers and to only 6 percent in the 
case of widows (in contrast to 24 and 9 percent, respectively, ten years earlier). 
The amplitude of the variations observed in primo nuptiality can be attributed in 
part to the variations registered by the mean age at first marriage (see Figure 3). 
In the case of females, this statistic declined somewhat slowly from 24.3 years in 
1945 to 22.2 years in 1972 and thereafter increased relatively quickly to regain by 
the mid-1980s a value reminiscent of the mid-1940s (24.8 years in 1986). Similarly, 
for males, this statistic declined from 27.3 years in 1945 to 24.7 years in 1972 before 
increasing to 27.0 years by 1986. 
Finally, although legal marriage is still the dominant type of union in Canada, 
consensual union is increasingly favored, especially among younger adults. 
According to Statistics ~ a n a d a , ~  the proportion of common-law couples among 
husband-wife families increased from 6.3 percent in 1981 to 8.3 percent in 1986. 
Divorce 
In the recent past, while the propensity to marry has been oriented downward, the 
propensity to divorce has been oriented upward. Thus, the proportion of marriages 
ending in divorce has grown substantially from 19 percent in 1971 to 29 percent in 
1981 (see Table 1). 
Mortality 
Between 1951 and 1986, life expectancy at birth increased by almost nine years for 
females (from 70.9 to 79.7 years) and by about six and a half years for males (from 
66.4 to 73.0 years), thus causing the mortality gap observed between the two sexes 
to increase from 4.5 to 6.7 years (see Table 2). This improvement in life expectancy 
at birth, however, was not regular over time, in particular for males. After 
experiencing a substantial increase in the fifties, female life expectancy at birth grew 
steadily over the next two decades before registering a modest gain in the early 
eighties. By contrast, male life expectancy displayed a more erratic pattern of 
m e  figures shown in this table (as well as in Table 2) are drawn from multistate life tables 
calculated on the basis of mortality, nuptiality, divorce, and widowhood rates, measured as three-year 
averages around the census years. 
3~tatistics Canada. 1989. 1986 Census of Canada-Population and Dwelling Ch~uaeteristics-FamiIies: 
Part I, Catalogue 93-106. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada (Table 2). 
change as it improved comparatively less in the 1960s and comparatively more in 
the early 1980s. 
Note that these changes in life expectancy compound differing paces of change in 
mortality rates across the age continuum. Thus, if a large part of the improvement 
in life expectancy at birth until the late 1970s can be attributed to declining 
mortality rates in the older segment of the Canadian population, such is not the 
case in the early 1980s. Because mortality rates did not drop much beyond age 60 
and not at all beyond age 80, the rise in life expectancy at birth observed between 
1981 and 1986 (from 71.9 to 73.0 years in the case of males) stemmed essentially 
from a decrease in mortality under age 60. 
Immigration 
Canada's growth has been sparked by successive waves of immigrants who arrived 
in periods of favorable socio-economic conditions. Today, although the proportion 
of immigrants is smaller in relation to the country's population, net immigration 
remains an important component of population growth. This is because the other 
component, natural increase, tends to drop under the influence of low fertility rates 
(see Figure 4). 
Future T r e h  
Extrapolation of the most recent trends suggest the probability of a stabilization of 
fertility at a level equal to or slightly below present level. Thus, for the purpose of 
defining a "national scenario" for Canada, unchanged patterns of fertility are 
assumed. 
In the case of marital change, we presume that, if they were available for 1986, 
multistate life table statistics directly comparable to those presented in Table 1 for 
previous census years would most likely reveal a trend toward the stabilization of 
marriage and divorce rates. As a result, patterns of marital change are also assumed 
to remain unchanged in the national scenario. 
Even though further improvement in life expectancy at birth can be rightfully 
expected, projection of mortality rates is not that obvious. Given this, it is simply 
assumed in the national scenario that age-specific mortality rates will decline by a 
common percentage point (different for each gender) so that the resulting life 
expectancies at birth present an evolution identical to that hypothesized by Statistics 
Canada in its last round of national projections." By 2011, life expectancy at birth 
should reach 84.0 years for females and 77.2 years for males, thus leaving 
unchanged the mortality gap between the sexes observed in 1986.' 
'Statistics Canada. 1990. Population Projections for Canada, Provinces, and Tenifories, 1989-2011, 
Catalogue 91-520. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada. 
'observe that this assumption means a slightly higher reduction in mortality for males than for 
females. 
Finally, net immigration is a much more volatile factor. For example, the number 
of immigrants admitted into the country was substantially higher in the second than 
in the first half of the 1980s. Considering the current desire of Canadian authorities 
to maintain a high immigration level (250,000 annual immigrants until 1995), 
surviving immigrants (that is, immigrants surviving to the end of each projection 
interval) were, for the purpose of the national scenario, set at twice their 1981-1986 
level (without altering their age/sex comp~sition).~ 
2. CHANGES IN THE SIZE AND AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION 
Since the end of the baby boom, the population of Canada has continued to grow, 
but its rate of growth has diminished continuously so that a decrease in total 
population is a definite possibility in the more or less distant future. Under 
unchanged demographic conditions ("benchmark scenario"),' the size of the 
Canadian population (25.3 million in 1986) would, some time in the early 21st 
century, reach a maximum of slightly over 30 million and thereafter would decrease 
at a pace that would tend to accelerate after 2031. 
A similar pattern of change would be observed under the "mortality scenario" and 
the "western scenario" (see Table 3). But, whereas the restruction of the mortality 
gap between the two genders built into the mortality scenario would delay the 
occurrence of the population maximum as well as inflate its size (by about two 
million persons), the decrease in fertility built into the western scenario would have 
an opposite effect: the occurrence of the population maximum would be hastened 
and its size deflated by 1.5 million persons. 
By contrast, in the case of the other impact scenarios, population size would 
continue to increase until the projection horizon (2051), the year in which it would 
reach 33.3 million (fertility scenario) or 36.4 million (migration scenario). 
Finally, since the only feature that distinguishes the national scenario from the 
migration scenario is a more favorable mortality assumption (declining rather than 
constant mortality rates), the same evolution--but somewhat amplified-- would be 
observed under the national scenario: population size would reach 38.5 million in 
2051. 
In other words, the six scenarios considered can be grouped into two categories: a 
first category of scenarios (including the benchmark scenario) in which a reversal 
in the evolution of total population would take place some time within the first 
three decades of next century and a second category of scenarios (including the 
m e  same hypothesis was used for the migration scenario. 
'Surviving immigrants were taken equal to their 1981-1986 level while emigration rates were kept 
identical to their 1986 values. 
national scenario) in which total population would continue to grow beyond the 
middle of next century. 
The above categorization of scenarios remains in force when examining the pattern 
of change that would be observed at the level of three broad age groups: under 15 
(young-age population), 15-59 (working-age population), and 60 and over (elderly 
population). Under the scenarios of the first category (comprising the benchmark 
scenario), a pattern of change similar to that observed at the aggregate level 
(increase followed by a decrease) would be observed for all three age groups. But 
again, the maximum population level would be reached more or less rapidly and at 
a level more or less similar to the corresponding 1986 level. For example, the size 
of the young-age population would pass through a maximum very quickly and 
thereafter would decrease rapidly, falling in 2051 by as much as 30 percent in the 
benchmark and mortality scenarios and 60 percent in the western scenario with 
regard to the 1986 level. For the working-age population, the decline in population 
would be much less (about 20 percent in the benchmark and mortality scenarios, 
and 35 percent in the western scenario). Finally, the size of the elderly population 
would increase more substantially and pass at a comparatively later date through 
a comparatively higher maximum so that by 2051 it would range between 1.6 
(benchmark scenario) and 2.4 times (mortality scenario) the 1986 level. 
Under the scenarios of the other category (comprising the national scenario), the 
young-age and working-age populations would continue to grow for a while before 
fluctuating around levels similar to (fertility scenario) or substantially higher than 
(migration and national scenarios) their 1986 levels. At the same time, the old-age 
population would continue to increase until the projection horizon, thus ensuring 
the continuous pattern of growth exhibited at the aggregate level! 
Viewed in relation to the evolution of the total population, the changes reported 
above mean that, regardless of the scenario examined, the proportion of the 
younger and older age groups in the total population would continue to evolve in 
the same direction as in the last 25 years. According to the benchmark scenario, the 
proportion of those under 15, which declined from 33.9 percent in 1961 to 21.3 
percent in 1986, would decline further, but at a slower pace, to reach 16.3 percent 
in 2031, whereas the proportion of those 60 and over, which increased from 10.8 
percent in 1961 to 15.1 percent in 1986, would increase further--at an especially 
rapid pace in the first quarter of next century--to reach 27.3 percent in 2031. 
Changes of similar magnitudes would be observed in the case of the national 
scenario. But, as one would expect, more moderate changes would be observed in 
the fertility scenario--by 2031, the proportion of those under 15 would be as high 
as 19.5 percent and that of those of 60 and over would be as low as 23.6 
percent--and amplified changes would be observed in the western scenario--by 203 1, 
'under the fertility scenario, however, the old-age population would decline slightly after 2031 but 
the size fluctuations displayed by the other two groups are such that, as seen earlier, population would 
continue to grow at the aggregate level. 
the young-age proportion would be as low as 11.8 percent and the elderly 
population as high as 34.3 percent. 
At the same time, the proportion of the working-age population, which grew from 
55.2 percent in 1961 to 63.8 percent in 1981 is expected to decrease, especially after 
2001, and to fall by 2031 to about its 1961 level (except in the mortality scenario in 
which the decline would be larger by 2.5 percentage points). 
As time passes, the growth rates of the populations in the three broad age groups 
tend to converge--unless alternative fertility assumptions are made (in the fertility 
and western scenarios)--and thus in most instances the three age group proportions 
tend to stabilize, notably after 2031. In other words, the Canadian population will 
experience substantial aging in the future, but, unless fertility behavior changes, this 
phenomenon will virtually cease after 2031. 
The latter result is also apparent in Table 4 which presents the expected evolutions 
of various dependency ratios'. According to this table, the young-age dependency 
ratio is expected to decrease until 2016 and the old-age dependency ratio to 
increase until 2031, with only small variations expected thereafter. In particular, the 
young-age dependency ratios displays the same evolution under the benchmark and 
the national scenario, whereas the old-age dependency ratio would increase faster 
under the national scenario than under the benchmark scenario (because the 
substantial decline in mortality built into the national scenario would hasten the 
increase in this ratio even more than a doubling of immigration also built into this 
scenario would delay it). 
3. CHANGES IN THE MARITAL COMPOSITION OF THE ELDERLY 
POPULATION 
In Canada, just as in the other countries in this comparative study, the elderly 
population presents a striking imbalance between the genders, although less severe 
since Canada registered comparatively fewer war losses. In 1986, there were 77.1 
men per 100 women in the population aged 60 and over. In the future, such a 
gender imbalance should remain at more or less the same proportion. Under 
present mortality conditions but with zero net immigration (benchmark scenario), 
the masculinity ratio of the population aged 60 and over should change very little 
between now and the middle of next century as it would fluctuate by no more than 
one percentage point from its 1986 value. Further mortality reductions along 
recently observed trends--that is, slightly more for males than for females--would 
improve the value of this ratio, whereas accounting for immigration at a level equal 
to or double of its level in the early 1980s would worsen it. But, in both cases, the 
absolute change in value that would result would be so small that, for any plausible 
combination of mortality/imrnigration assumptions, the masculinity ratio would 
experience variations that do not depart radically from those in the benchmark 
scenario. By 2051, there would be 75.3 men per 100 women in the national scenario 
as against 76.6 in the benchmark scenario (and 77.1 in 1986). Only if the mortality 
gap between the two genders were substantially reduced (by half according to the 
mortality scenario) would the masculinity ratio increase substantially (up to 91.7 
percent by 2051). 
As one would expect from its gender imbalance, the elderly population displays and 
will display a marital structure for females that is somewhat different from that for 
males. In 1986, only one in two elderly women (49.0 percent) were married as 
opposed to four in five elderly men (79.2 percent), and two in five elderly women 
(40.3 percent) were widowed as opposed to one in ten elderly men (10.5 percent) 
(see Table 5). The proportion of elderly single, however, was similar (7.9 percent 
for females and 7.5 percent for males), as was, because of higher remarriage rate 
of divorced males, the proportion divorced (2.8 percent for females and 2.7 percent 
for males). 
With marriage and divorce intensities maintained at their 1986 levels (in all 
scenarios except the western scenario), the marital composition of the elderly 
population would evolve in much the same way. Thus, the proportion single among 
elderly of both genders would experience an initial moderate decline followed by 
a substantial increase. But the reversal would take place earlier and at a faster pace 
for males than for females so that in year 2051 the proportion single would reach 
9.8-10.6 percent for females but 13.8-15.2 percent for males (as opposed to 7.5 and 
7.9 percent, respectively, in 1986). The lower values corresponding to the national 
scenario and the higher ones to the benchmark scenario. 
The proportion married for both genders would initially register a substantial 
decline, and, after a 15-year period of relative respite during which the male 
proportion would remain unchanged or increase slightly and the female proportion 
would decrease slightly, it would register another substantial decline. Excluding the 
mortality scenario, this would, by 2051, bring down the female proportion to 
36.1-38.8 percent and the male proportion to 62.1-63.3 percent (as opposed to 49.0 
and 72.0 percent, respectively, in 1986). The lower values correspond this time to 
the benchmark scenario and the higher ones to the national scenario. Were the 
mortality gap between the two genders to be reduced according to the mortality 
scenario, the two proportions would still present the same pattern of evolution, but, 
as one would expect, the proportion of females married would increase (because of 
the reduced incidence of widowhood) and that for males would decrease more 
(because of the increased incidence of widowhood) to reach by 2051 41.7 and 59.4 
percent, respectively. 
The proportion divorced for both genders would initially increase and after about 
a quarter of a century would stabilize, at a level of about 12 percent for females and 
9 percent for males (about four and three times, respectively, the 1986 level) and 
a slightly higher level (by one percentage point) in the case of the mortality 
scenario. 
Finally, the proportion widowed would present a more complex evolution as it 
would first increase, then decrease, and finally increase again. By 2051, this 
proportion would range from 39.5 to 42.0 percent as opposed to 40.3 percent in 
1986 in the case of females and from 13.7 to 14.0 percent as opposed to 10.5 
percent in 1986 in the case of males. A substantial reduction in the mortality gap, 
however, would help to deflate the proportion of widowed females and inflate that 
of widowed males to 35.4 and 16.3 percent, respectively (mortality scenario). 
Interestingly, changes in nuptiality intensity as assumed in the western scenario 
would noi &ndamentally alter the evolutions of the various marital proportions 
discussed above, at least until 2031 (date at which the population aged 60 and over 
is the one surviving from the 1986 population aged 15 and over). But after this date, 
striking changes would take place as the proportion single would about double over 
the next 20 years to reach, by 2051, 20.2 percent for females and 29.3 percent for 
males (as opposed to 10.6 and 15.2 percent, respectively, in the benchmark 
scenario). Accordingly, the proportion married would decrease sharply, falling by 
2051 to 27.8 percent for males and 45.1 percent for females (as opposed to 36.1 and 
62.1 percent, respectively, in the benchmark scenario). 
It thus seems that, despite current uncertainty about the evolution of marriage and 
divorce patterns, there is little uncertainty about the evolution of the marital 
composition of the elderly population of both genders. Between now and the middle 
of next century, the proportion single will double (if nuptiality rates remain 
unchanged) or quadruple (if they evolve as assumed in the western scenario), 
whereas the proportion divorced will triple for males and quadruple for females (if 
nuptiality rates remain unchanged) and somewhat more (in the western scenario). 
Finally, as the magnitudes of the evolutions expected for the various marital 
proportions differ slightly between the genders, it is likely that the similarity of the 
female and male marital compositions will vary over time. According to the figures 
shown in the last column of Table 5, the two marital compositions will, regardless 
of the scenario, become more similar and after 2031 (as one would expect from the 
evolutions of the individual marital status proportions) more dissimilar. The level 
of dissimilarity reached by 2051 would be comparable to that of 1986 under all 
scenarios except the mortality scenario in which it would be substantially less. 
4. THE PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEM 
Canada's system of public pensions encompasses three main programs: 
1. the Old Age Security (OAS) program, a universal demogrant program with a 
common benefit paid to all who reach age 65 after meeting residency 
requirements; 
2. the Canadian and Quebec Pension Plans (CIQPP), a social insurance program 
with employment-related benefits to those who contributed during their 
working lives; and 
3. the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIs) program, a social welfare program 
with benefits subject to an income test, which takes account of income from 
the C/QPP and other sources. 
Both the OAS and GIs programs are run by the federal government through 
ta~at ion .~  In mid-1986, whereas virtually every Canadian aged 65 and over received 
under the OAS program a monthly'benefit of $291.51, almost exactly one in two 
received an additional benefit under the GIs program. And although only one 
beneficiary in five received the maximal amount ($346.45 for a single pensioner and 
$225.63 for each pensioner in a two-pensioner family), the average monthly benefit 
paid under this program amounted to about $250 (see Table 6). 
The Canadian Pension Plan and the Quebec Pension Plan are compulsory 
government plans that call for contributions, analogous to insurance premiums, from 
employees and employers alike, and from self-employed workers, without 
government subsidy. Until 1986, employees contributed 1.8 percent of their earnings 
and their employers an identical amount, whereas self-employed contributed 3.6 
percent of their earnings.'0 The contributions are essentially used to provide 
retirement pensions and survivor's benefits.'' 
Regarding retirement pensions, the general aim of the C/QPP is to provide, in 
addition to the GIs pension, 25 percent of a worker's earned income up to a 
maximum of 25 percent of the national average wage. The normal age for 
retirement is age 65, but flexible retirement provisions (see details below) make it 
possible for retirement to occur any time between ages 60 and 70. In mid-1986, 
because the C/QPP had not yet reached maturity-it was created in 1966--less than 
six in ten elderly aged 65 and over received a retirement pension, and, of those, less 
than three in ten received the maximal amount of $486.11 a month. The average 
monthly pension paid was then about half that amount ($249.93). 
Survivor's benefits are paid to the surviving spouse of a dead contributor if he/she 
is aged 35 or more at the time of the contributor's death. Age is not a factor, 
however, if he/she has dependent children or is disabled. In 1986, a monthly 
premium of at most 60 percent of the deceased contributor's pension and equal to 
$164.44 on average (the maximum was $291.67) was received by more than a half 
a million people. Among the beneficiaries were 300,000 persons aged 65 and 
over--that is, just over one in three of those widowed in that age group. 
9 0 n  September 1,1985, the federal government initiated another program, the Spouse's Allowance 
(SPA) program, intended to provide a special benefit to 60-to-64-year-old widow(er)s, irrespective of 
the deceased spouse's age at death. 
'O~ommencin~ in 1987, a schedule of rising contributions was adopted, under which the total 
contribution rate would rise 0.2 percent a year for five years and then 0.15 percent a year for the next 
20 years, thus reaching 7.6 percent by 2011 (as opposed to 3.6 percent in 1986). 
"Other benefits include disability pensions, orphan's benefits, as well as death benefits paid to a 
contributor's spouse or estate on his/her death. 
5. WORK AND RETIREMENT PATTERNS 
Over the last two decades, labor force participation has increased substantially, 
especially for females, as revealed by a single comparison of age-specific labor force 
participation (LFP) rates in 1971 and 1986 (see Figure 5). But, while LFP rates are 
still oriented upward for females, they are now oriented downward for males. This 
picture, however, only applies to the core of the working-age population (ages 15 
to 64). LFP rates for those ages 55 to 64 have either remained unchanged (in the 
case of females) or decreased slightly (in the case of males), whereas LFP rates for 
those 65 and over (for both genders) have dropped significantly, having been cut by 
half between 1971 and 1986. 
Naturally, labor force participation is strongly affected by marital status. In the case 
of females, the never-married are comparatively more active (above age 20), while 
the married are comparatively less active (between ages 25 and 64) (see Figure 6). 
The opposite situation, however, holds for males as the never-married (married) are 
comparatively less (more) active. 
In the past, although they were not eligible for a C/QPP retirement pension (as 
well as for OAS benefits) until reaching age 65, Canadians often retired before that 
age. At the same time, a small fraction continued to work past age 65 so that in 
1986 the mean age at retirement was 63.1 years for females and 63.4 years for 
males. Using past LFP rates observed for the proper cohort, the average number 
of years worked at mean age of retirement was estimated at 42.2 years for males 
as opposed to 17.1 years for females. In the future, based on LFP rates kept 
constant at their 1986 levels, lifetime activity is supposed to decrease slightly for 
males (because LFP rates in 1986 are slightly less than what they once were) and 
naturally to increase substantially for females. Eventually, lifetime activity would 
level off and stabilize (while registering small fluctuations) shortly after 2000 for 
males and some 30 years later for females. The average number of years worked 
would eventually reach 40 years for males and 31 years for females (see Table 7). 
In view of the variability of the age at which Canadians actually retire, recent 
legislation has made possible for those retiring earlier (later) than 65 to draw upon 
retirement (at any age between ages 60 and 70) smaller (larger) benefits. The basic 
premium awarded to a 65-year-old is reduced (in case of early retirement) or 
increased (in case of postponed retirement) by 0.5 percent for each month between 
the attainment of age 65 and the time of retirement. 
Introduction of the above retirement provisions do not appear to have radically 
altered age patterns of retirement, although Canadians are now prone to retire as 
soon as they can take advantage of the new provisions. In the summer of 1989,54.5 
percent of new C/QPP beneficiaries (60.2 percent for females, 49.7 percent for 
males) were less than 65 years old, with about half of them (25.6 percent of all new 
beneficiaries) being exactly the minimal pensionable age of 60 years (see Figure 7). 
Virtually all other beneficiaries were age 65--the fraction of those older than 65 
years was 4.72 percent--because payment of a C/QPP pension is no longer 
contingent on a retirement test! 
6. THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC PENSIONS 
On the benefits side, the IIASA pension model operates at the level of the average 
retiree. Consequently, since the average Canadian retiree enjoys a higher income 
than is needed to receive benefits under the GIs program, its application to the 
Canadian context ignores GIs payments entirely. Thus, it only considers two types 
of benefits: old-age benefits (OAS benefits + C/QPP retirement pensions) and 
survivor's benefits (C/QPP survivor's pensions). 
The evolution of estimated benefits, assuming a constant value through time of OAS 
and C/QPP payments to individual beneficiaries,12 is displayed in Tables 8 and 9. 
Under the benchmark scenario, total benefits would increase steadily over the next 
decades and after passing in about 50 years from now through a maximum (equal 
to 2.5 times the level estimated for 1986)13 would decrease moderately: see Table 
9. Note the somewhat parallel evolution of the two types of benefits so that the 
proportion of survivor's benefits in the total amount of benefits would remain more 
or less constant at 5.5 percent: see Table 9. 
Under the other scenarios except the national, very similar evolutions would be 
observed inasmuch as the marital composition of the elderly population would 
change in much the same way as in the benchmark scenario. Such is the case 
especially in the migration scenario but not in the mortality scenario. The reduction 
in the mortality differentials between the two genders, and specifically the decrease 
in mortality rates of males built into this scenario, would lead to a prolonged 
increase in the two types of benefits, especially in the case of survivor's 
benefits--they would not decline after 2031. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the 
increase would be higher for old-age benefits than for the alternative type so that 
in this case the proportion of survivor's benefits would in fact decline, falling to 4.2 
percent by 2051. 
As suggested by the figures pertaining to the mortality and migration scenarios, 
higher immigration and especially reduced mortality would bring about a more 
substantial increase in total benefits, peaking at a later date. In fact, under 
appropriate combinations of (a) a high enough immigration level and (b) a 
substantial reduction in mortality as in the national scenario, total benefits would 
continue to increase until after the horizon of our projection (2051). By then, they 
''As a result, the evolutions of the two types of benefits simply reflect the evolutions of (a) the 
number of retirees in the case of old-age benefits and (b) the number of survivors in the case of 
survivor's benefits. 
13~or the initial year of the projection (1986), survivor's benefits are correctly estimated at $1.3 
million, whereas old-age benefits are overestimated: $20.1 million versus an actual level of $13.2 
million. Such a discrepancy follows from the fact that the average retiree received somewhat less than 
the maximal benefits (as assumed by the IIASA model)--a situation that will persist until the C/QPP 
reaches maturity. 
would reach $77.0 billion, that is, is 3.3 times the estimated level of 1986 or 5.3 
times the actual level of 1986. Note that until 2031 old-age benefits would grow 
slightly faster than s u ~ v o r ' s  benefits--the proportion of s u ~ v o r ' s  benefits in the 
total benefits would thus fall from 5.6 percent in 1986 (in this case) to 4.5 percent 
in 2031--but slightly less rapidly after that date, thus contributing to a reversal in the 
evolution of the above proportion (4.9 percent in 2051). 
On the contributions side, the IIASA pension model considers only 
employment-related contributions and thus no account is taken here of the provision 
of the OAS benefits paid by the federal government out of the general budget. We 
thus concern ourselves with just C/QPP contributions. 
Such contributions are determined by applying to the size of the labor force an 
average individual contribution maintained through time at its 1986 value ($784), 
which was obtained as the appropriate fraction (3.6 percent) of the average 
industrial wage ($420 per week or $21,840 for the year). Thus, given the size of the 
labor force (13.2 million), estimated contributions for 1986 amount to $10.3 
mi11ion.14 
In the future, estimated contributions would indeed change in direct proportion to 
total labor force, the evolution of which under various scenarios is shown in Table 
10 (upon assuming constant age-specific LFP rates). Under the benchmark scenario, 
the size of the labor force would increase until early next century and after 
approaching 15 million (as opposed to 13.2 million in 1986) would decrease, falling 
to 13.7 million by 2051. Such an evolution, which is reminiscent of the one observed 
earlier in the case of the working-age population, would also take place under the 
mortality and western scenarios. By contrast, under the other scenarios, labor force 
would grow further, reaching 15.8 million (benefits scenario) to 17.9 million 
(national scenario). 
It thus follows that the future evolution of contributions will be much less dramatic 
than that of benefits. Estimated contributions will increase slightly over the next 
three decades before returning by the middle of next century to a level equal or 
similar to their 1986 level. With high enough immigration, however, such a reversal 
would be delayed, but estimated contributions would grow so slowly that they would 
keep the same order of magnitude. 
"As kith benefits, this estimated number overestimates somewhat (by about two-thirds) the actual 
one (6.4 million). This is because (a) total labor force overestimates the number of contributors (11.8 
million)--total employment would be more appropriate-and @) the average contribution per active 
person was only $542. 
Contributions-to-Benefits Ratio 
Based on the IIASA pension model, contributions are presently much lower than 
benefits--for 1986, the ratio of the former to the latter was estimated to be 0.44. 
Moreover, since expected demographic changes will drive up contributions even 
more than benefits, the gap between the two will increase in the future. By 2051, 
the contributions-to-benefits ratio will fall to 0.19 under the national scenario and, 
more generally, to 0.15-0.22, depending on the scenario retained (see upper panel 
of Table 11). 
Recall that part of the old-age benefits (OAS benefits) are provided by the federal 
government out of the general budget. Thus, for the above contributions-to-benefits 
ratio (labeled as type I ratio), let us substitute a similar ratio (labeled as type I1 
ratio) obtained by subtracting OAS payments from old-age benefits. Evolution of 
this alternative ratio (see lower panel of Table 11) is still oriented downward, but, 
as would be expected, its values are much higher. Thus, under the national scenario, 
the type II ratio would decrease from 0.74 in 1986 to 0.31 in 2051. 
Because the IIASA pension model overestimates both contributions and benefits, 
but in different proportions, the observed value of the type I1 ratio for 1986 is not 
0.74 but rather 6.4 billionl5.5 billion = 1.16. And, had the CIQPP already reached 
maturity, benefits would have been higher by 5.3 billion* and the type I1 ratio 
would have then been 0.59. This suggests that, under the national scenario, the type 
Il ratio is more likely to decrease from 1.16 in 1986 to 0.31 x 0.5910.74 = 0.25 in 
2051. In accordance with the demographic slowdown likely to take place after 2031, 
the mismatch between contributions and benefits, however, would increase up to 
2031 and then stabilize. 
Table 12 displays the contribution rates that would result in a balanced pension 
system up to the middle of the next century. Under the national scenario, the 
balanced contribution rate would have to increase from 4.8 percent in 1986 to 6.0 
percent in 2001 and 11.1 percent in 2031. Adjusting for the overestimation of 
contributions and benefits in the IIASA pension model, the balanced contribution 
rate would have in fact to increase from 3.6 percent in 1986 to 14.8 percent in 2051. 
Note that the value required for 2016 (10.2 percent) is somewhat higher than the 
contribution rate (8.35 percent) that will be effective that year under the measures 
recently taken to revamp the CIQPP (see Section 4). 
As a consequence of the lower mortality implicit to them, the western and mortality 
scenarios assume a comparatively higher number of beneficiaries and thus suggest 
higher contribution rates to maintain the pension system under financial 
equilibrium. By contrast, the effort required is slightly less under the migration 
scenario and especially the fertility scenario. In the latter case, the additional labor 
force induced by higher fertility manages after some time (after 2031) to drive up 
'5This figure was obtained by attributing to each recipient the maximum amount of OAS or 
survivor's pension he/she would be entitled to. 
contributions faster than benefits and thus to push down the balanced contribution 
rate. 
7. IMPACT OF SELECTED POLICY MEASURES 
In view of the anticipated degradation of contributions vis-a-vis benefits, this section 
investigates how policy measures designed to bring about a larger labor force would 
contribute to reducing the mismatch between contributions and benefits. Below two 
possible scenarios based on demographic conditions similar to those underlying the 
benchmark scenario16 are examined. In the first, the "GDR scenario", a larger 
labor force stems from increasing labor force participation, whereas in the second, 
the "65 scenario", it stems from delaying retirement. 
Specifically, the GDR scenario assumes that by the year 2006, Canadians will have 
a pattern of labor force participation identical to that exhibited in 1985 in the 
German Democratic Republic. This latter pattern is characterized by a high 
participation of women and, as a result, the average number of years worked by 
females would increase very rapidly, reaching 35.2 years in 2001 versus 22.1 years 
in the benchmark scenario (see Table 13). 
As a consequence of higher labor force participation, the size of the labor force 
would surpass substantially that of the benchmark scenario. At the turn of the 
century, the addition to the labor force would be 12.1 percent higher. Thereafter, 
as labor force participation rates are assumed to remain constant after 2006, the 
additions to the labor force should decline slightly in absolute terms (as a result of 
the built-in demographic assumptions) but should not change much in relative 
terms. In fact, a uniform magnification of 12-13 percent--which on the basis of the 
IIASA pension model is equally applicable to the amount of contributions--would 
be observed throughout the first half of next century. 
At the same time, the number of retirees would register a deficit of only several 
hundred thousand in 2001 that would increase slightly over time as the additions to 
the labor force just mentioned would eventually retire. Note that this deficit would 
consist exclusively of women as the labor force participation of older males in the 
GDR is virtually identical to that observed in Canada. In relative terms, the 
shortfall in the retired population would oscillate between 6 and 8 percent 
throughout the next half of the century. As the amount of survivor's benefits would 
remain the same as in the benchmark scenario, this translates into a 5-7 percent 
deficit in the amount of total benefits. 
Compounding the relative changes in contributions and benefits estimated above 
yields a relative change of about 20 percent in the contributions-to-benefits ratio 
which, considering the anticipated low values of this ratio under the benchmark 
161mplementation of this section was carried out by simply assuming no external migration. 
Accounting for this component of change, however, would affect the results only marginally. 
scenario, is unlikely to restore financial equilibrium of the C/QPP scheme (see 
Table 14). 
Alternatively, the 65 scenario assumes that age at retirement for both genders is 
progressively raised to reach 65 years by 2005 and that no survivor's pensions are 
served under 60." With such an assumption, the average number of years worked 
would register a rather modest upward shift of 1.2 years for females and 2.2 years 
for males by 2051 (see Table 13). The size of the labor force thus would present 
additions, divided equally between the two genders, of about half a million in 
absolute terms and about 4 percent in relative terms. Such an impact is indeed 
much smaller than in the GDR scenario (12-13 percent) because, unlike the latter 
scenario which assumes an upward shift in labor force participation for all age 
groups, the 65 scenario assumes such an upward shift only for the older age groups. 
By contrast, the shortfall in the retired population, again divided equally between 
the genders, would be much higher than in the GDR scenario. It could reach 1.3 
million early next century before stabilizing at 1.1 million after 2031. This is about 
15 percent above the corresponding level in the benchmark scenario versus 6.8 
percent in the case of the GDR scenario. 
The combined influence of the shifts in the labor force and in the retired population 
just assessed results, on the basis of the IIASA pension model, in an upward shift 
in the contributions-to-benefits ratio of about 20 percent, but slightly under this 
mark this time (see Table 14). 
To conclude, the two alternative policy measures investigated here appear to have 
very similar long-term effects on the Canadian system of public pensions. Both 
would lead to a 20 percent improvement in the value of the 
contributions-to-benefits ratio relating to the C/QPP scheme (slightly more in the 
case of the GDR scenario, slightly less in the case of the 65 scenario), but they 
would achieve this result in quite a different way. The first scenario is geared 
foremost toward increasing contributions whereas the second is essentially aiming 
to reduce benefits.18 
8. CONCLUSION 
Under any plausible scenario, the anticipated growth of the old-age population will 
be higher than that of the working-age population until about 2030. Thus, the ratio 
of the former to the latter (old-age dependency ratio) will be multiplied by 2.3 
between now and 2030, which is likely to exert some tremendous pressures on the 
"Higher labor force participation rates are also assumed for the age groups 55-59 and 60-64. 
'90 evaluate fully this result, it must be borne in mind that the benchmark scenario used in this 
section assumes non-zero retirement ratios before age 65, whereas in fact payments under the OAS 
scheme and, until recently, under the C/QPP scheme, are made only to elderly 65 and over. 
financing of (1)OAS benefits through taxation and (2) retirement and survivor's 
pensions through the C/QPP. 
In addition, the lower nuptiality and higher divorce intensities that prevail today as 
compared to earlier decades leads one to anticipate a significant modification of the 
marital composition of the elderly population. On the one hand, the expected 
decrease in the proportion married and thus in the proportion widowed (all the 
more so because of an expected reduction in mortality) will reduce the proportion 
of those elderly entitled to survivor's pensions and thus under the C/QPP scheme 
retirement benefits will grow comparatively more than survivor's pensions. On the 
other hand, the expected increase in the proportion single and divorced will 
augment the proportion of those entitled to full-rate payments under the federal 
government's GIs scheme. 
In other words, the expected aging of the Canadian population is likely to exert 
tremendous pressures on Canada's public pension system. Benefits are likely to 
increase rapidly and, based on demographic considerations alone, the increase will 
be higher (lower) for GIs benefits (C/QPP survivor's benefits) than for retirement 
benefits paid under both the OAS and C/QPP schemes. 
Regarding the Q/CPP scheme, future demographic patterns (in terms of fertility, 
mortality, marital change, and immigration) are likely to bring about, between now 
and 2030, a doubling in value of the ratio of the number of beneficiaries to that of 
 contributor^.'^ From this, application of the IIASA pension model, based on an 
unchanged contribution rate, suggests the inevitable degradation of the financial 
equilibrium of the C/QPP scheme. The same result, however, would be obtained, 
were the contribution rate increased according to the schedule indicated in footnote 
10. 
'gBeyond 2030, the two numbers will evolve more or less in the same way. 
Table 1 
Nuptiality statistics by gender: 1970-1 972, 1975-1 977, and 1980-1982 
Females Males 
Proportion ever marrying .92 .90 .88 .90 .88 .85 
Mean age at first 
marriage (in years) 22.80 23.75 24.69 24.95 25.95 26.98 
Proportion of marriages 
- ending in widowhood .58 .53 -51 .23 .20 .20 
- ending in divorce .19 .26 .29 .19 .27 .29 
Proportion of individuals 
remarrying among 
- widow(er)s .09 .07 .06 .24 .21 .17 
- divorcees .79 .75 .69 .85 .84 .80 
Source: 0. B. Adams and D. N. Nagnur (1988), Marriage, Divorce, and Mortality: A Life 
Table for Canada and Regions, 1980- 1982, Catalogue 84-536. Ottawa: Supply 
and Services Canada. 
Table 2 
Mortality statistics by gender, 1950-1 982 to 1985-1 987 
Life expectancy (in years) Survivors (per 1,000 born) 
Year At birth At age At age At age At age 
60 80 60 80 
Females 
Males 
Sources: 1950-1 952 to 1985-1 987: Statistics Canada, Life Tables and Provinces, 
Catalogue 84-206. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada (various issues). 
1985-1 987: Statistics Canada (1 989), Life Tables, Canada and Provinces, 1985- 
1987, Standard Table 41044. Health Division, Statistics Canada, Ottawa. 
Table 3 
Population by broad age groups, 1951 -2051 
Absolute (thousands) Relative (percent) 
Year 0-14 15-59 60+ Total 0-14 15-59 60+ Total 
Benchmark scenario 
5 744 17 825 4 859 28 428 20.2 
5 083 17 993 6 752 29 828 17.0 
5096 16817 8232 30145 16.9 
4 698 16 275 7 859 28 832 16.3 
Fertility scenario 
6031 17825 4859 28715 21 .O 
6016 18268 6752 31036 19.4 
6318 17966 8232 32516 19.4 
6499 18988 7859 33346 19.5 
Mortality scenario 
5 752 17 876 5 076 28 704 20.0 
5114 18193 7829 31136 16.4 
5152 17088 10127 32367 15.9 
4774 16641 10330 31745 15.0 
Western scenario 
Migration scenario 
5016 30069 20.4 62.9 16.7 100.0 
7 144 33 284 17.6 61.0 21.5 100.0 
9 104 35 433 17.4 56.9 25.7 100.0 
9 379 36 391 16.8 57.4 25.8 100.0 
National scenario 
Source: 1951 to 1986: Statistics Canada (1987), 1986 Census of Canada - Population and 
Dwelling Characteristics - Age, Sex, and Marital Status, Catalog ue 93- 1 0 1 . Ottawa: 
Supply and Services Canada. 
Table 4 
Dependency ratios, 1986-2051 
Year 
Scenario 1986 2001 201 6 2031 205 1 
Young-age dependency ratio 
Benchmark 31.3 30.2 25.5 27.4 26.0 
Fertility 31.7 29.8 32.0 31.2 
Mortality 30.1 25.3 27.1 25.7 
Western 28.3 19.9 21.2 19.2 
Migration 30.5 26.2 27.7 26.5 
National 30.4 26.1 27.6 26.4 













Total dependency ratio 







Marital composition of the population aged 60 and over by gender. 1986-2051 
Females Males 
hdex d 

















6.4 73.5 6.7 13.4 100.0 
6.9 71.7 8.5 12.9 100.0 
10.9 66.9 8.8 13.4 100.0 
14.2 63.1 8.8 14.0 100.0 
National scenario 
6.4 74.5 6.7 12.4 100.0 
6.9 72.8 8.7 11.6 100.0 
10.5 68.0 9.1 12.4 100.0 
13.8 63.3 9.2 13.7 100.0 
a This Index is calculated by means d D = 0.5 I 1, - m i  I where fi and m, are the poponions of those aged 60 and over who are of marital status i among 
bmales and males, respedrvely. 1 
Table 6 





beneficiaries ~ e r  re- (billions of 
(thousands)a Maximum Average dollars)b 
Schemes financed throuah taxation 
1. Old Age Security (OAS)2 651.2C 291.51 291.51 8.9 
2. Guaranteed Income 346.451 
Security (GIs) 1 329.94 225.63e - 250 3.3 
Total 12.5~ 
CanadaIQuebec Pension Plan (C/QPP) 9 
3a. Retirement benefits 1 ~ 7 3 . 5 ~  486.1 1 249.93 4.3 
3b. Survivors' benefits 1 5~56.5~ 291.67 1 64.44 1.2 
Total 6.81 
a. In March 1986. 
b. For fiscal year 1985-1 986. 
c. According to the 1986 census, the population aged 65 and over was 2,697.6 thousand. 
d. 21.1 percent of those beneficiaries received the maximum amount of benefit. 
e. The first figure is the maximum amount awarded to a single pensioner; the second is the 
maximum amount awarded to each pensioner in a two-pensioner family. 
f. Includes $0.3 billion under the new Spouse's Allowance (SPA) program. 
g. During the 1986 calendar program, 11,761.9 thousand people contributed to the CIQPP 
plan for a total amount of $6.4 billion. 
h. Percent of those beneficiaries who receive the maximum benefit. 
i. lncludes 251.9 thousand survivors under 65 years old. 
j Includes other types of benefits (disability benefits, orphan's benefits, and death benefits). 
Sources: Health and Welfare Canada (1 986), Canada Pension Plan Statistical Bulletin, 
vol. 18, no 2. 
Health and Welfare Canada ( 1 986), Canada Pension Plan Contributors 1986. 
Ministere des affaires sociales du Quebec (1988), Statistiques 1987 - Rdgime 
de rentes du Quebec /Allocations familiales du Qudbec. 
Health and Welfare Canada (1988), Inventory of lncome Security Programs in 
Canada. Recent Initiatives and Statistical Update as of January 1987. 
Table 7 
Average number of years worked at mean age at retirement by gender, 1986-2051 
(benchmark scenario) 
Year 
Gender 1986 200 1 201 6 203 1 205 1 
Females 17.1 22.1 28.4 31.1 31.1 
Males 42.2 40.9 39.8 40.4 40.1 
Table 8 
Pension benefits, 1986-2051 
Value (millions of dollars) Index (1 986 = 100) 
Type of 
Scenario benefits 1986 2001 2016 2031 205 1 2001 2016 2031 2051 
Benchmark Old age 22 265 
Survivor's 1 324 
Total 23 590 
Mortality Old age 
Survivor's 
Total 
Western Old age 
Survivor's 
Total 
Migration Old age 
Survivor's 
Total 




Pension benefits, 1986-2051 : distribution by type and average annual growth rates 
Distribution by type Average annual growth rate (%) 
Type of 
Scenario benefits 1986 2001 2016 2031 205 1 1986- 2001- 2016- 2031- 
2001 2016 2031 2051 
Benchmark Old age 94.4 
Survivor's 5.6 
Total 100.0 
Mortality Old age 
Survivor's 
Total 
Western Old age 
Survivor's 
Total 
Migration Old age 
Survivor's 
Total 





Evolution of the labor force by gender, 1986-2051 
Year 
Scenario Gender 1986 2001 201 6 203 1 2051 
Size (thousands) 
5 673 6 248 6 338 6 004 
7490 8283 8582 8217 







































Evolution of the contributions-to-benefits ratio, 1986-2051 
Year 







Type I ratio 
0.44 0.36 0.28 0.20 0.20 
0.36 0.28 0.21 0.23 
0.34 0.24 0.1 6 0.1 5 
0.35 0.26 0.1 7 0.16 
0.37 0.30 0.22 0.22 
0.37 0.28 0.22 0.19 
Type II ratio 
Benchmark 0.74 0.60 0.47 0.34 0.25 
Fertility 0.60 0.48 0.36 0.29 
Mortality 0.58 0.4 1 0.28 0.26 
Western 0.59 0.45 0.30 0.27 
Migration 0.62 0.50 0.36 0.37 
National 0.59 0.45 0.32 0.31 
Table 12 
Contribution rates (percent) corresponding to a balanced pension fund, 
1986-2051 
Year 
Scenario 1986 200 1 201 6 2031 2051 






Note: 1986 actual contribution rate was 3.6 percent. 
Table 13 
Impact of selected policy measures on the gender-specific results of the benchmark scenario, 
1986-2051 
Year 
Scenario Gender 1986 2001 201 6 2031 2051 
A- Percentage change in the average number of years worked 
GDR Females 59.2 27.8 16.7 16.7 
Males 9.2 11.0 8.2 8.2 
65 Females 5.8 4.2 3.8 3.8 
Males 4.6 5.3 5.5 5.5 
B- Percentage change in total benefits 
GDR Females -1 0.9 -1 0.5 -9.0 -1 0.0 
Males t t t t 
Both -6.4 -6.1 -5.3 -5.9 
65 Females -15.7 -1 8.5 -1 2.3 -1 4.5 
Males -20.8 -24.2 -1 7.4 -18.1 
Both -1 7.5 -20.9 -14.4 -1 6.0 
G Percentaae chanae in labor force 
GDR Females 18.0 17.2 16.6 16.9 
Males 7.6 9.3 9.5 10.0 
Both 12.1 12.6 12.5 12.9 
65 Females 3.6 5.3 4.4 5.3 
Males 2.7 3.6 3.9 4.1 
Both 3.1 4.3 4.1 4.6 
Table 14 
Impact of selected policy measures on the contributions-to-benefits (type II) ratio of the 
benchmark scenario, 1986-2051 
Year 
Scenario 
Benchmark 0.74 0.60 0.47 0.34 0.25 
GDR 0.72 0.56 0.40 0.30 
Figure 1 
Total fertility rate, 1945-1 988 
year 
Source: Statistics Canada, Vital Statistics - Births and Deaths, Catalogue 84-204. Ottawa: 
Supply and Services Canada (various annual issues). 
Figure 2 
Percentage of births to non-married females, 1945-1986 
year 
Source: Statistics Canada, Vital Statistics - Births and Deaths, Catalogue 84-204. Ottawa: 
Supply and Services Canada (various annual issues). 
Figure 3 
Mean age at first marriage by gender, 1945-1 986 
Year 
females - - - - - males 
Source: Statistics Canada, Vital Statistics - Marriages and Divorces, Catalogue 84-205. Ottawa: 
Supply and Services Canada (various annuel issues). 
Figure 4 
Components of population growth (thousands). 
1951 -1 952 to 1987-1 988 
year 
I I I Pop. change - - - - - Natural increase - - - - - - - - - Net migration I 
Source: Statistics Canada (1990), Postcensal Annual Estimates of Population by Marital 
Status. Age, Sex, and Components of Growth for Canada, Provinces, and Territories, 
June 1, 1989. Catalogue 91-210. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada. 
Figure 5 
Labor force participation rates (percent) 
by gender: 1971,1981, and 1986 
age group 
- fem. 1971 - fem. 1981 - fem. 1986 
mal. 1971 - mal. 1981 * mal. 1986 
Source: Statistics Canada (1989), 1986 Census of Canada - Activity, Catalogue 93-1 11 
Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada. 
Figure 6 
Female labor force participation rates (percent) 
by marital status, 1986 
age group 
never married - married ---r--- widowed/divor all 
ced 
Source: Statistics Canada (1989), 1986 Census of Canada - Activity, Catalogue 93-1 11. 
Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada. 
Figure 7 
Cumulative distribution of new CIQPP retirement 
pensions by age: July-September 1989 
males - - - - - females ~ 
Source: Health and Welfare Canada, Income Security Programs - Monthly Statistics, Ottawa 
(various monthly issues). 
